The world's population is currently overcoming one of the worst pandemics, and the psychological and social effects of this are becoming more apparent. We will present an analysis of the psychosocial effects of COVID-19: first, a cross-sectional study in an Ecuadorian sample and second, a comparative study between two samples from the Ecuadorian and Spanish populations. Participants completed an online survey to describe how they felt before and after confinement; analyze which emotional and behavioral variables predict depressive symptoms, anxiety, and (...) stress perceived after the confinement; carry out a comparative study in a sample of Ecuadorian and Spanish surveys. Results indicate, first, that Ecuadorians experience significantly more depressive symptoms, anxiety, and stress after confinement. Second, variables which predict depressive symptoms and anxiety are greater public prosocial tendency, less stress as a challenge, and greater stress as a threat, as well as an empathetic tendency that implies greater emotional regulation. Experienced stress after confinement was predicted by a greater public prosocial tendency, as well as an empathetic tendency. Finally, scores for depression, anxiety, and stress are higher after confinement in both countries. However, results reveal the similarity of the psychosocial effects that are being experienced, regardless of the country, and the differences in the variables that can help explain these effects. This can contribute to the constitution of intervention plans which aim to soften and alleviate the effects produced by a situation such as that experienced with COVID-19. (shrink)

Science is the study of our world, as it is in its messy reality. Nonetheless, science requires idealization to function—if we are to attempt to understand the world, we have to find ways to reduce its complexity. Idealization and the Aims of Science shows just how crucial idealization is to science and why it matters. Beginning with the acknowledgment of our status as limited human agents trying to make sense of an exceedingly complex world, Angela Potochnik moves on to explain (...) how science aims to depict and make use of causal patterns—a project that makes essential use of idealization. She offers case studies from a number of branches of science to demonstrate the ubiquity of idealization, shows how causal patterns are used to develop scientific explanations, and describes how the necessarily imperfect connection between science and truth leads to researchers’ values influencing their findings. The resulting book is a tour de force, a synthesis of the study of idealization that also offers countless new insights and avenues for future exploration. (shrink)

Artículos Ciudadanía y sociedad civil en las democracias contemporáneas. Citizenship and civil society in contemporary democracies. de La Vega, Marta El poder simbólico de los medios de comunicación.The transformations of the political in the field of the symbolic.González Broquen, Ximena La rutinizacion de la indiferencia ética y el aplanamiento de los valores en la Argentina actual. Ethical indifference routine and smoothing moral in contemporary Argentine. Meabe, Joaquín E. Jürgen Habermas: entre la ética del discurso y la ética de la (...) especie. Jürgen Habermas: between the ethics of discourse and the ethics of the species. Moreno Lax, Alejandro Derechos humanos y proceso justo.Human rights and rightful process. Ramos Pascua, José Antonio El Fedón o la trascendencia del alma.Phaedo or the inmortality of the soul. Robledo Rodriguez, Alejandro La enseñanza del derecho en los países de derecho escrito.Legal education in civil law systems. Rodríguez Ferrara, Mauricio De cómo los latinoamericanos percibimos la pena de muerte. How latin-americans view the death penalti. Rodríguez Ferrara, Mauricio La doctrina platónica del alma en el 'Timeo'.The platonic doctrine of soul in 'Thimaeus'. Suzzarini, Andrés Interdisciplinares Bajo los murmullos: tributo a Juan Rulfo. Under the whispers: a homage to Juan Rulfo. Camacho Crispín, Marco Antonio Recensiones Semblanza del jurista venezolano Tulio Chiossone. Belandria, Margarita Informaciones Índice acumulado. (shrink)

According to sensorimotor theory perceiving is a bodily skill involving exercise of an implicit know-how of the systematic ways that sensations change as a result of potential movements, that is, of sensorimotor contingencies. The theory has been most successfully applied to vision and touch, while perceptual modalities that rely less on overt exploration of the environment have not received as much attention. In addition, most research has focused on philosophically grounding the theory and on psychologically elucidating sensorimotor laws, but the (...) theory’s ramifications for neuroscience still remain underexamined. Here we sketch the beginnings of a research program that could address these two outstanding challenges in terms of auditory perception. We review the neuroscience literature on passive listening, which is defined as listening without overt bodily movement, and conclude that sensorimotor theory provides a unique perspective on the consistent finding of motor system activation. In contrast to competing theories, this activation is predicted to be involved not only in the perception of speech- and action-related sounds, but in auditory perception in general. More specifically, we propose that the auditory processing associated with supplementary motor areas forms part of the neural basis of the exercise of sensorimotor know-how: these areas’ recognized role in facilitating spontaneous motor responses to sound and supporting flexible engagement of sensorimotor processes to guide auditory experience and enable auditory imagery, can be understood in terms of two key characteristics of sensorimotor interaction, its “alerting capacity” and “corporality”, respectively. We also highlight that there is more to the inside of the body than the brain: there is an opportunity to develop sensorimotor theory into new directions in terms of the still poorly understood active processes of the peripheral auditory system. (shrink)

Nuestro objetivo es analizar críticamente el enfoque de la noción de modelo de Alfred Tarski que Patrick Suppes integra en su concepción semanticista de las teorías científicas. En efecto, mostraremos cómo esta noción se configura en Suppes (1969; 1970) desde una revisión formal de la noción de modelo en Tarski (1936), focalizando nuestro análisis en tres ejes principales: i) una crítica a la perspectiva estática del semanticismo; ii) un análisis de las condiciones restrictivas y el lenguaje para la axiomatización de (...) teorías; y iii) la revisión de las nociones de ‘sistema axiomático’, ‘sistema formal’ y ‘método axiomático’. (shrink)

Rodrigo Castro Orellana La première partie de l’article analyse certains des aspects fondamentaux du débat sur la théologie politique, principalement à partir des recherches de Carl Schmitt. Ensuite, il étudie la mise à jour de cette controverse par Giorgio Agamben en identifiant ses principaux enjeux théoriques et politiques. Enfin, dans la troisième section, l’article étudie le contraste entre le concept de pouvoir pastoral de Michel Foucault et la version spécifique de la sécularisation proposée par le paradigme théologico-historique.

In the target article, Sagvolden and collaborators propose that attentional-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is the result of a general behavioral deficit which is mainly caused by a hypofunctioning mesolimbic dopaminergic system. Although we partly agree with this view, we think that it tends to overlook the dysfunction of prefrontal and frontostriatal executive functions by considering them to be a consequence of alterations in reward and extinction mechanisms. Rather, we believe that ADHD is the result of an overall cognitive and behavioral condition, (...) associated to a generalized dopaminergic network dysfunction, and may not be easily attributable to a single basic behavioral function. (shrink)

A pesar de su singular condición urbana, de su atractivo internacional, y de ser la segunda ciudad en importancia de Chile, Valparaíso no cuenta con una suficiente historiografía de su pasado urbano. Este artículo pretende ser un aporte a ella, teniendo a los cerros como protagonistas, para estudiar su la etapa inicial de poblamiento. Se centra en el proceso en que se fueron instalando viviendas - que constituyeron una fisonomía urbana particular, además de barrios-, en los distintos cerros de Valparaíso, (...) diferenciando etapas tanto en alturas como en cerros. Se pone especial atención, también, en los tipos de viviendas pobres y serranas de esa época y, finalmente, en las conclusiones, se plantean algunos problemas de investigación futura, relativos al urbanismo histórico de los cerros de Valparaíso. (shrink)

Frente a un proceso histórico de larga data inscrito en las transformaciones de la familia, el final del siglo pasado ha visto declinar la autoridad paterna propia de la matriz familiar patriarcal y moderno-industrial, abriendo un nuevo lugar al padre. Sobre la base de treinta entrevistas, este artículo analiza los cambios en las representaciones de la paternidad en distintos grupos sociales chilenos, las rupturas intergeneracionales y los modelos de paternidad contemporáneos, poniendo en evidencia los límites del cambio del orden de (...) género tradicional aunque los padres actuales se muestren más involucrados y cercanos a sus hijos en un contexto en que convive el padre moderno con el “amo” que gobierna la familia restaurando la tradición. (shrink)

En este texto se revisa la presencia de imágenes de vehículos motorizados, que aparecen en documentales argentinos de la década del cuarenta, y que dan cuenta de problemáticas como el territorio, la frontera chileno-argentina o el trabajo épico. Se analiza La amistad de dos naciones a partir de tensiones limítrofes entre Chile y Argentina; y El trasandino del Norte, en relación a la figura del trabajador. Se consideran, como antecedentes o contrastes, filmes del periodo silente argentino y chileno, en este (...) último caso, por medio de registros de prensa. (shrink)

Resumen: El artículo estudia los aspectos fundamentales de la crítica de Dussel al modelo formal de hegemonía desarrollado por Laclau. En este contexto, se presenta la propuesta de una hegemonía popular ligada a la centralidad de la reproducción de la vida como criterio normativo de la política y se denuncia el decisionismo abstracto de la teoría populista laclauniana. Pero también en este texto se ofrece, siguiendo la lectura de Castro-Gómez, una crítica de las tesis de Dussel desde un punto de (...) vista postfundacionalista, lo que supone cuestionar la idea misma de un universal incondicionado. Finalmente, concluimos exponiendo una crítica a algunas de las coordenadas teóricas compartidas por ambos autores, identificando las limitaciones del concepto mismo de hegemonía.: This article studies the fundamental aspects of Dussel’s critique of the formal model of hegemony developed by Laclau. In this context, a concept of popular hegemony tied to the centrality of the reproduction of life as a normative criterion in politics is proposed, as well as an argument against the abstract decisionism of the populist theory of Laclau. The text also offers -as suggested by Castro-Gomez’s reading- a critique of Dussel’s ideas from a post-foundationalist perspective, which leads to questioning the very idea of an unconditional universal. Finally, we conclude by positing a critique of some of the theoretical viewpoints shared by both authors, identifying the limitations of the very concept of hegemony. (shrink)

Recently, a number of philosophers have begun to question the commonly held view that choice or voluntary control is a precondition of moral responsibility. According to these philosophers, what really matters in determining a person’s responsibility for some thing is whether that thing can be seen as indicative or expressive of her judgments, values, or normative commitments. Such accounts might therefore be understood as updated versions of what Susan Wolf has called “real self views,” insofar as they attempt to ground (...) an agent’s responsibility for her actions and attitudes in the fact (when it is a fact) that they express who she is as a moral agent. As such, they seem to be open to some of the same objections Wolf originally raised to such accounts, and in particular to the objection that they cannot license the sorts of robust moral assessments involved in our current practices of moral responsibility. My aim in this paper is to try to respond to this challenge, by clarifying the kind of robust moral assessments I take to be licensed by (at least some) non-volitional accounts of responsibility and by explaining why these assessments do not in general require the agent to have voluntary control over everything for which she is held responsible. I also argue that the limited applicability of the distinction between “bad agents” and “blameworthy agents” on these accounts is in fact a mark in their favor. (shrink)

Using data collected at two phases, this study examines why and how ethical leadership behavior influences employees’ evaluations of organization-focused justice, i.e., procedural justice and distributive justice. By proposing ethical leaders as moral agents of the organization, we build up the linkage between ethical leadership behavior and the above two types of organization-focused justice. We further suggest trust in organization as a key mediating mechanism in the linkage. Our findings indicate that ethical leadership behavior engenders employees’ trust in their employing (...) organization, which in turn promotes their justice perceptions toward the organization. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed, and some directions for future research are suggested. (shrink)

A number of philosophers have recently argued that we should interpret the debate over moral responsibility as a debate over the conditions under which it would be “fair” to blame a person for her attitudes or conduct. What is distinctive about these accounts is that they begin with the stance of the moral judge, rather than that of the agent who is judged, and make attributions of responsibility dependent upon whether it would be fair or appropriate for a moral judge (...) to react to the agent in various (negative) ways. This is problematic, I argue, because our intuitions about whether and when it would be fair to react negatively to another are sensitive to a host of considerations that appear to have little or nothing to do with an agent’s responsibility or culpability for her attitudes or behavior. If this is correct, then theories which make attributions of responsibility dependent upon the appropriateness of our reactions as moral judges will turn out to be fundamentally misguided. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIt has recently become fashionable among those who write on questions of moral responsibility to distinguish two different concepts, or senses, of moral responsibility via the labels ‘responsibility as attributability’ and ‘responsibility as accountability’. Gary Watson was perhaps the first to introduce this distinction in his influential 1996 article ‘Two Faces of Responsibility’ , but it has since been taken up by many other philosophers. My aim in this study is to raise some questions and doubts about this distinction and (...) to argue that it has led to confusion rather than clarification in debates over moral responsibility. In place of the attributability/accountability distinction, I propose that there is a single concept of moral responsibility underlying our actual moral practices. This core notion of moral responsibility, which I call ‘responsibility as answerability’, is well positioned to explain thos.. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss two questions. What does Kant understand by mechanical explanation in the Critique of judgment? And why does he think that mechanical explanation is the only type of the explanation of nature available to us? According to the interpretation proposed, mechanical explanations in the Critique of judgment refer to a particular species of empirical causal laws. Mechanical laws aim to explain nature by reference to the causal interaction between the forces of the parts of matter and (...) the way in which they form into complex material wholes. Just like any other empirical causal law, however, mechanical laws can never be known with full certainty. The conception according to which we can explain all of nature by means of mechanical laws, it turns out, is based on what Kant calls ‘regulative’ or ‘reflective’ considerations about nature. Nothing in Kant’s Critique of judgment suggests that these considerations can ever be justified by reference to how the natural world really is. I suggest that what, upon first consideration, appears to be a thoroughly mechanistic conception of nature in Kant is much more limited than one might have expected. (shrink)

The 1940s and 1950s were marked by intense debates over the origin of drug resistance in microbes. Bacteriologists had traditionally invoked the notions of ‘training’ and ‘adaptation’ to account for the ability of microbes to acquire new traits. As the field of bacterial genetics emerged, however, its participants rejected ‘Lamarckian’ views of microbial heredity, and offered statistical evidence that drug resistance resulted from the selection of random resistant mutants. Antibiotic resistance became a key issue among those disputing physiological vs. genetic (...) explanations of variation in bacteria. Postwar developments connected with the Lysenko affair gave this debate a new political valence.Proponents of the neo-Darwinian synthesis weighed in with support for the genetic theory. However, certain features of drug resistance seemed inexplicable by mutation and selection, particularly the phenomenon of ‘multiple resistance’—the emergence of resistance in a single strain against several unrelated antibiotics. In the late 1950s, Tsutomu Watanabe and his collaborators solved this puzzle by determining that resistance could be conferred by cytoplasmic resistance factors rather than chromosomal mutation. These R factors could carry resistance to many antibiotics and seemed able to promote their own dissemination in bacterial populations. In the end, the vindication of the genetic view of drug resistance was accompanied by a recasting of the ‘gene’ to include extrachromosomal hereditary units carried on viruses and plasmids. (shrink)

Some mental states seem to be "of" or "about" things, or to "say" something. For example, a thought might represent that grass is green, and a visual experience might represent a blue cup. This is intentionality. The aim of this book is to explain this phenomenon. -/- Once we understand intentionality as a phenomenon to be explained, rather than a posit in a theory explaining something else, we can see that there are glaring empirical and in principle difficulties with currently (...) popular tracking and functional role theories of intentionality, which aim to account for intentionality in terms of tracking relations and functional roles. -/- This book develops an alternative theory, the phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT), on which the source of intentionality is none other than phenomenal consciousness, the subjective, felt, or qualitative aspect of mental life. While PIT avoids the problems that plague tracking and functional role theories, it faces its own challenges in accounting for the rich and complex contents of thoughts and the contents of nonconscious states. In responding to these challenges, this book proposes a novel version of PIT, on which all intentionality is phenomenal intentionality, though we in some sense represent many non-phenomenal contents by ascribing them to ourselves. This book further argues that phenomenal consciousness is an intrinsic feature of mental life, resulting in a view that is radically internalistic in spirit: Our phenomenally represented contents are literally in our heads, and any non-phenomenal contents we in some sense represent are expressly targeted by us. (shrink)

This paper examines the US Atomic Energy Commission’s radioisotope distribution program, established in 1946, which employed the uranium piles built for the wartime bomb project to produce specific radioisotopes for use in scientific investigation and medical therapy. As soon as the program was announced, requests from researchers began pouring into the Commission’s office. During the first year of the program alone over 1000 radioisotope shipments were sent out. The numerous requests that came from scientists outside the United States, however, sparked (...) a political debate about whether the Commission should or even could export radioisotopes. This controversy manifested the tension between the aims of the Marshall Plan and growing US national security concerns after World War II. Proponents of international circulation of radioisotopes emphasized the political and scientific value of collaborating with European scientists, especially biomedical researchers. In the end, radioisotopes were shipped from the Commission’s Oak Ridge facility to many laboratories in England and continental Europe, where they were used in biochemical research on animals, plants, and microbes. However, the issue of radioisotope export continued to draw political fire in the United States, even after the establishment of national atomic energy facilities elsewhere. (shrink)

There is increasing attention to the centrality of idealization in science. One common view is that models and other idealized representations are important to science, but that they fall short in one or more ways. On this view, there must be an intermediary step between idealized representation and the traditional aims of science, including truth, explanation, and prediction. Here I develop an alternative interpretation of the relationship between idealized representation and the aims of science. In my view, continuing, widespread idealization (...) calls into question the idea that science aims for truth. I argue that understanding must replace truth as the ultimate epistemic aim of science. Additionally, science has a wide variety aims, epistemic and non-epistemic, and these aims motivate different kinds of scientific products. Finally, I show how these diverse aims---all rather distant from truth---result in the expanded influence of social values on science. (shrink)

This article argues that resolutions are reason-giving: when an agent resolves to φ, she incurs an additional normative reason to φ. Resolution-making is therefore a normative power: an ability we have to alter our normative circumstances through sheer acts of will. I argue that the reasons we incur from forming resolutions are importantly similar to the reasons we incur from making promises. My account explains why it can be rational for an agent to act on a past resolution even if (...) temptation causes a shift in her preferences and even her judgment about what to do, and offers a response to a common objection to the normativity of resolutions known as the bootstrapping problem, on which if resolutions were reason-giving, they would problematically allow us to bootstrap any action into rationality simply by resolving to perform it. (shrink)

The concept of hierarchical organization is commonplace in science. Subatomic particles compose atoms, which compose molecules; cells compose tissues, which compose organs, which compose organisms; etc. Hierarchical organization is particularly prominent in ecology, a field of research explicitly arranged around levels of ecological organization. The concept of levels of organization is also central to a variety of debates in philosophy of science. Yet many difficulties plague the concept of discrete hierarchical levels. In this paper, we show how these difficulties undermine (...) various implications ascribed to hierarchical organization, and we suggest the concept of scale as a promising alternative to levels. Investigating causal processes at different scales offers a way to retain a notion of quasi-levels that avoids the difficulties inherent in the classic concept of hierarchical levels of organization. Throughout, our focus is on ecology, but the results generalize to other invocations of hierarchy in science and philosophy of science. (shrink)

To begin with, it is analysed the representation of the urban space which is articulated in some classical and utopian stories (Moro, Campanella). In these stories we are facing with a proposal of ideal society as expression of an organizing will of human reason which faces with nature and bets for the construction of a better future. In this context, those cities dreamt by utopias must be considered as imaginary skethes in a concept of real construction which determined a large (...) extent of urban modernity. Such utopian will has suffered an important break throughout the second half of XX Century, such as it is testified by a serial of anti-utopia stories both in literature (Orwell, Huxley or Dick); and above all, in the recently filmography (Blade Runner, Brazil or Matrix). This displacement in future cities´desing entails not only a reversal on the utopian speech codes, which would be the real reflection of the contemporary experience of the subject inside the urban space, but also a consequence of the development and crisis in Western modernity. In addition, this involves a decisive mutation in the concept of future which would affect substantially to our civilization in the beginning of the XXI Century. (shrink)

Current Perspectives in Philosophy of Biology.

When we evaluate artworks, we often point to what an artist could have done or what a work could have been in order to say something about the work as it actually is. Call this counterfactual reasoning in art criticism. On my account, counterfactual claims about artworks involve comparative aesthetic judgments between actual artworks and hypothetical variations of those works. The practice of imagining what an artwork could have been is critically useful because it can help us understand how artworks (...) achieve specific aesthetic effects. I conclude by responding to an objection to my account on the basis that it violates the widely accepted acquaintance principle in aesthetics, on which aesthetic judgments must be based on firsthand perceptual encounters with their objects. (shrink)

In this paper, I first outline the view developed in my recent book on the role of idealization in scientific understanding. I discuss how this view leads to the recognition of a number of kinds of variability among scientific representations, including variability introduced by the many different aims of scientific projects. I then argue that the role of idealization in securing understanding distances understanding from truth, but that this understanding nonetheless gives rise to scientific knowledge. This discussion will clarify how (...) my view relates to three other recent books on understanding by Henk de Regt, Catherine Elgin, and Kareem Khalifa. (shrink)

Despite the recent proliferation of scientific, clinical, and narrative accounts of auditory verbal hallucinations, the phenomenology of voice hearing remains opaque and undertheorized. In this article, we outline an interdisciplinary approach to understanding hallucinatory experiences which seeks to demonstrate the value of the humanities and social sciences to advancing knowledge in clinical research and practice. We argue that an interdisciplinary approach to the phenomenology of AVH utilizes rigorous and context-appropriate methodologies to analyze a wider range of first-person accounts of AVH (...) at 3 contextual levels: cultural, social, and historical; experiential; and biographical. We go on to show that there are significant potential benefits for voice hearers, clinicians, and researchers. These include informing the development and refinement of subtypes of hallucinations within and across diagnostic categories; “front-loading” research in cognitive neuroscience; and suggesting new possibilities for therapeutic intervention. In conclusion, we argue that an interdisciplinary approach to the phenomenology of AVH can nourish the ethical core of scientific enquiry by challenging its interpretive paradigms, and offer voice hearers richer, potentially more empowering ways to make sense of their experiences. (shrink)

Las tres novelas escogidas responden a la decadencia económica de Valparaíso a mediados del siglo XX al representar el espacio y la sociedad, así como los afectos predominantes: Valparaíso, puerto de nostalgia de Salvador Reyes, se sitúa en el Plan de la ciudad y fluctúa entre la idealización nostálgica de la burguesía inglesa y la bohemia del presente; Hijo de ladrón de Manuel Rojas y El mundo herido de Armando Méndez Carrasco, privilegian, en cambio, el espacio de los cerros y (...) transitan hacia un período de duelo frente al tiempo perdido, actualizando, respectivamente, los valores ilustrados y la comunidad tradicional. (shrink)

This paper aims to propose an inferential and dynamic approach to understanding with models in biology. Understanding plays a central role in the practice of modeling. From its links with the other two central elements of scientific research, experimentation, and explanation, we show its epistemic relevance to the case of explanation in biology. Furthermore, by including the notion of understanding, we propose a non-referentialist perspective on scientific models, which is determined by their use.

This paper aims to propose an inferential and dynamic approach to understanding with models in biology. Understanding plays a central role in the practice of modeling. From its links with the other two central elements of scientific research, experimentation, and explanation, we show its epistemic relevance to the case of explanation in biology. Furthermore, by including the notion of understanding, we propose a non-referentialist perspective on scientific models, which is determined by their use.

En las últimas dos décadas ha surgido en epistemología una perspectiva que rescata la noción de _comprensión_ e intenta ponerla en el foco principal de la discusión sobre la modelización científica, al considerar que tiene un papel fundamental en la actividad del conocimiento. Desde una breve revisión de algunas ideas del pragmatismo americano y del inferencialismo de Mauricio Suárez, el objetivo de este trabajo es proponer una definición inferencial de la comprensión científica. Se afirma que la comprensión cumple un papel (...) central en la práctica de la modelización, como término de éxito cognitivo, y que puede introducirse como una noción importante para la discusión acerca de la función explicativa que tienen los modelos. (shrink)

This paper explores the main philosophical approaches of David Hilbert’s theory of proof. Specifically, it is focuses on his ideas regarding logic, the concept of proof, the axiomatic, the concept of truth, metamathematics, the a priori knowledge and the general nature of scientific knowledge. The aim is to show and characterize his epistemological approach on the foundation of knowledge, where logic appears as a guarantee of that foundation. Hilbert supposes that the propositional apriorism, proposed by him to support mathematics, sustains (...) — on its turn — a general method for the treatment of the problem in other areas such as natural sciences. This method is axiomatic. Broadly speaking, we intend to recover and update the Hilbert’s philosophical thinking about the role of logic for scientific knowledge. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to propose the notion of dialogical assertion as a minimal unit of knowledge in the frame of dialogical pragmatism. We argue that this minimal unity is the dialogue for the p thesis, accompanied by its game of giving and asking for reasons for a winning strategy for the proponent. Thereby, we explore the problem from the semantic framework proposed by Shahid Rahman to present a dialogical definition of that concept. Furthermore, we show how the (...) notion of proposition ceases to be the primordial logical concept and how it is replaced by the notion of assertion as an act in the process of a dialogue game and following the fundamental insights of Brandom and Martin-Löf. This pragmatic approach to logic will abandon the idea that the proposition is the minimum logical unit of true knowledge. (shrink)

Causal accounts of scientific explanation are currently broadly accepted (though not universally so). My first task in this paper is to show that, even for a causal approach to explanation, significant features of explanatory practice are not determined by settling how causal facts bear on the phenomenon to be explained. I then develop a broadly causal approach to explanation that accounts for the additional features that I argue an explanation should have. This approach to explanation makes sense of several aspects (...) of actual explanatory practice, including the widespread use of equilibrium explanations, the formulation of distinct explanations for a single event, and the tight relationship between explanations of events and explanations of causal regularities. (shrink)

The predominant view is that a study using health data is observational research and should require individual consent unless it can be shown that gaining consent is impractical. But recent arguments have been made that citizens have an ethical obligation to share their health information for research purposes. In our view, this obligation is sufficient ground to expand the circumstances where secondary use research with identifiable health information is permitted without explicit subject consent. As such, for some studies the Institutional (...) Review Board/Research Ethics Committee review process should not assess the practicality of gaining consent for data use. Instead the review process should focus on assessing the public good of the research, public engagement and transparency. (shrink)

A common argument against explanatory reductionism is that higher‐level explanations are sometimes or always preferable because they are more general than reductive explanations. Here I challenge two basic assumptions that are needed for that argument to succeed. It cannot be assumed that higher‐level explanations are more general than their lower‐level alternatives or that higher‐level explanations are general in the right way to be explanatory. I suggest a novel form of pluralism regarding levels of explanation, according to which explanations at different (...) levels are preferable in different circumstances because they offer different types of generality, which are appropriate in different circumstances of explanation. (shrink)